Tibetans not related to "yeti"

"All our analyses clearly indicate that the yeti is nested
several nodes within a specific ungulate group (i.e., the
perissodactyls, cf. Fig. 1) and, more specifically, forms a
subclade with sequences U02581 and X79547 (cf. figure
legend). These results demonstrate that extensive mor-
phological convergences have occurred between the yeti
and primates."

[PDF]
http://www.ulb.ac.be/sciences/ueg/pdf_files/yeti_1st_April04.pdf

Genetic Chaos

Added to the blogroll: Genetic Chaos, a blog of abstracts and links to the full text of hundreds of papers "using genetic research to study human migration patterns."

Prazeros and Boers: mestizaje, cultural exchange, and the ideology of identity

Knowing very little detail about the history of the former Portuguese East Africa, I hadn't heard about this before, a second relatively autonomous eighteenth century expansion of European settlement in Southern Africa away from the more rigidly controlled (by European colonial governments/companies) coasts. This seems to be analogous at first to Boers expanding inland from the Cape, but had a very different character than in the also largely autonomous Dutch agricultural settlement of the Cape Province:

Early in the seventeenth century, the Portuguese government began to acknowledge the rights acquired by these estate-holders[, private Portuguese individuals who acquired land title from the Mwene Mutapa]. After 1629, when the government obtained pseudo-legal sovereignty over the Mwene Mutapa's realm, it tried to regularize relations along lines that had initially been devised to promote settlement in Brazil....

These constraints were generally ignored. Some prazos [(estates)] grew in size until they covered a thousand square miles or more. Successive generations of prazeros married spouses who might be Africans, Indians, or members of other estate-owning families. By the nineteenth century, four or five family groups of mixed descent—we might almost call them clans—owned vast stretches of land on either side of the Zambezi River, from Chicoa to the Indian Ocean. These families wielded virtually unlimited power throughout the area. Neither the neighboring African rulers nor the Portuguese government were able to control them....

Indeed, historical studies by Allen F. Isaacman and M.D.D. Newitt have shown that the prazos became more like African chiefdoms as the years went by. The prazeros and their families continued to use Portuguese names and titles and to profess Christianity; but they were barely literate, they spoke local African languages more than Portuguese, they were polygynous, they believed in witchcraft, and they performed the functions of African chiefs, including in some cases the ritual functions. In this way the Portuguese elements were gradually assimilated into the local African culture.

Curtin, et al. African History: From Earliest Times to Independence. Harlow: Longman, 1995.

Just as in the Americas, attributing the differences between activities by different colonial powers (and their settlers) to European cultural factors like Catholicism, Protestantism, Germanic, or Mediterranean culture is naive and rings of both Eurocentrism and the even narrower species of such found among, surprise, northern Europeans with that insidious ideology of separatism called, among other things, apartheid. The Cape Province and the Zambezi Valley were very different places: the first relatively sparsely settled by isolated pastoral and hunting peoples, the other one of the main sources of gold for the rich Indian Ocean trade routes – among the artifacts at the ruins of Great Zimbabwe, even after Rhodesians melted most of the valuables down were pottery from Iran and China.

In the same way, Spanish centers in the Americas were only so large and successful because they built on the structure of indigenous empires, and, as with any relationship where cultural exchange is both possible and advantageous, whether European, colonial, and recorded or ancient, pre-colonial, and not recorded (such as the first Bantu settlement of the Zambezi over two millennia ago), it tends to occur. It is often very unequal, particularly when migrants are economically powerful men, but it occurs, and the endurance of the power structures, myths, and legends of these men is the source of many of our illusions about identity and history—whether of Aryan North India, the extinction of the Celtic English, Han Chinese homogeneity. or "racially" pure Afrikaners or white Southerners in the U.S. Not everything is an illusion: languages are replaced and made extinct, people are enslaved and killed (the prazeros on the Zambezi themselves were good at this), and certain material cultures replace others, but something almost always endures. When nothing else does, it's ancestry. History has proven over and over than perception of ancestry turns into the reality of identity, so getting it right is very important.

What the Cape Province and British-settled North America really seem to have in common is not so much Germanic myth inspired apartheid, as much as dominant elements in those societies have tried, but the political and ideological institution of the same pushing off those people who do mix (and/or acknowledge) mixing into a legally separate caste identity: in South Africa, Coloureds, who are mixed Dutch, Khoikhoi, Malagasy, and Indonesian (the latter two groups slaves brought in from the Indian Ocean basin), and in the United States, the mixed, yet black, results of the one-drop rule. Yet... people passed into socioeconomically dominant groups whenever they could, with the result that there are many Southerners who are part African and many Afrikaners who are part Malagasy and Khoi.

Previous explanations of the difference between, say, the United States and Mexico, have tended to focus on the supposed higher Spanish Catholic tolerance for mixing resulting in a mixed population, and the lower English Protestant tolerance resulting in a non-mixed population. i would prefer to say that the difference is rather the acknowledgement of mixing, and thus the society allowing it to continue to take place multigenerationally rather than for people to be pushed off into one group or another and thus gradually become phenotypically less alike.

This distinction is extremely important. It acknowledges that people really do tend to be recently mixed in all descents from seventeenth century settler societies, as autosomal DNA tests are beginning to show. This is relevant not just to populations who have long-term ancestry in settler societies founded in post-Columbian colonial efforts. Even if your parents migrated from Ethiopia to Canada thirty years ago (or, of course, never left Ethiopia at all); these are just among the best documented and socially relevant in today's global identity structures.

If the difference is ideology formed in the past, it can be nullified in ideology formed about the past. Genealogy, traditional combined with genetic, has an important role to play here, as our results and those of our cousins begin to show the reality of a world in which ancestry is never location-bound for far in the past.

Review of Blood of the Isles / Saxons, Vikings, and Celts by Bryan Sykes

I just finished reading Blood of the Isles,₁ by Bryan Sykes of Oxford University. Sykes styles himself a genetic archaeologist, and in this book he spends as much time on the historiography and mythography of identity in Britain and Ireland as he does on interpretation of DNA tests. The result is a book that should be included as a text in any general survey history of the British Isles. It is the first history that uses genetic material as its primary data set, and it works very well, coming from a scholar with interests as well-rounded as Sykes. He outlines the way migrations to the Isles have been thought of, from the polemics of sixth century monks to the absurdities of nineteenth-century racists, sets out hypotheses based on the more reasonable theories, then tests them through data, separately for Ireland, Scotland, Wales, and England. The conclusion, and it is a very important step for our understanding of history to take, is that the British and Irish are basically one people, the same as they were when they settled the Isles from Spain as the ice receded, with only minor impact from the names that history records, Celts, Romans, Saxons, and Vikings. The impact of these peoples, genetic in part, was mostly cultural and historical.

Yet it suffers from one important fallacy, the same that the most brilliant minds in genetics still make. Anyone who understands the numbers involved, and Sykes clearly does, is able to see that a male resident of Aran, let's say, of matrilineal clan Ursula (a woman who lived in Greece something like 45,000 years ago), and carrying the Y-chromosome of Somerled, the Gael who drove the Vikings from the Isles, does not just have these two as ancestral lines. In a population that includes hundreds or thousands of lineages (all populations) which does not limit marriage to within both patrilineal and matrilineal clans (no population I'm aware of), most lineages in the society will become ancestral to most individuals, given only a few generations. I have no doubt that Sykes understands this, but it's curious that he doesn't emphasis it. To me it is the *most* fascinating part of genetic genealogy. Genetic genealogy has the potetntial to forge a quick connection to both local and worldwide communities, not just a single or dual marker of heritage.

That man from Aran is not just descended from Ursula, but from all mitochondrial lineages surviving in his population and from many mitochondrial lineages now extinct, but which lasted long enough to be counted among his ancestors. The same is true of all current and all marginalized Y chromosome haplotypes. He carries his descent from Ursula and Somerled in his genes, true, and there's something very exciting about that, but it's his invisible lineages, traceable only through testing uncles or cousins, close and distant, that reveal his true nature as an individual who encompasses in his DNA the entire diversity of his society, both other common haplotypes and very rare ones. Traceable genes may not be in his mitochondria or Y chromosome, genes may not even have been inherited from these people at all, but his ancestry is far, far more complicated than a simple story that goes to the ends of the Mediterranean and then back to Africa. It all goes back to Africa, of course, but by 2^lots routes, not 2.

I find it difficult to believe that Bryan Sykes has not thought this fallacy through. In Blood of the Isles, as throughout his popular work, Sykes strives to preserve the individual nature of data collected from his subjects' DNA, preferring to let stories, rather than statistics, emerge from the data. The first woman to carry a particular mDNA haplotype becomes a clan mother (his The Seven Daughters of Eve) instead of a number, and ubiquitous Y chromosome DNA lineages are traced, quite believably, to historical and mythological kings, warlords, and other such headmen. These are stories people can quite easily append to family histories that are much closer in time. Descent from Jasmine, the Syria-born matriarch of the Neolithic agricultural migrations into Europe, from Genghis Khan, or from Somerled, is a much more romantic notion than identity with R1B or O3 or H. It's certainly easier to talk about at the family reunion. Yet the essentially communal nature of genealogy brings in another question. Every nuclear family is made up of individuals of different matrilineal clan lineages, every extended family of many matrilineal and patrilineal ones. This is as easy a notion to understand as that a family can have many surnames. So why can't genetic genealogy explore it.

If I weren't confident that Sykes has science's best interests at heart, I would be cynical and say that he perhaps believes that Oxford Ancestors' coffers will be more easily filled if people feel they are getting a real sense of identity from their tests that their neighbors don't yet have. Perhaps this is true, and perhaps more people will send in cheek swabs to Oxford Ancestors or to Spencer Wells's Genographic Project if they think the not insubstantial money they are paying can tell them "where they come from", rather than one of the countless places. I repeat, every one of the thousands of test subjects that make up the data for the book descend not only from their assigned clans, but from all. Sykes acknowledges this when he writes that the Oisin clan was found in both Norway and Scotland, so that Oisin men from the Orkneys are not necessarily descended from Picts/Celts; he does this by wryly noting that the Vikings did not test their crew's Y-chromosomes. Advance this warning farther, and truly think about his subjects as individuals, and you start thinking about their fathers' mothers as well, their mothers' fathers, and every other line that passes through ancestors of more than one sex.

If Sykes's new view of British and Irish history exposes the poisonous notion of separate Saxon and Celtic peoples as a lie, a more nuanced view of genetic genealogical data can go even farther. Sykes tells human stories by bringing the individual line out of the data, a very important step, because it brings us away from very simplistic notions that would have peoples, not individuals, splitting off on the way out of Africa, perhaps never to reconcile. The next thing we need to do is put those individuals back into their societies by first putting them back into their families. Then, and only then, can genetic genealogy tell an accurate human story. It's one we all can, and need to, understand.

The U.S. title is Saxons, Vikings, and Celts, which is a strange change for a book which goes about proving that the migrations of Saxons, Vikings, and Celts aren't very significant contributors to British and Irish genotypes.

Fortunately the Mayflower wasn't the only ship in the world

"A more homogenous stock cannot be seen, I think, in any so extensive a region, at any time, since that when the ark of Noah discharged its passengers on Mount Ararat, except in the few centuries elapsing before the confusion of Babel."

James Savage, et al. A Genealogical Dictionary of the First Settlers of New England (1860).

Silly Puritans, valuing this sort of thing.

New York Times article on indigenous resistance to Genographic Project

"DNA Gatherers Hit Snag: Tribes Don’t Trust Them". Amy Harmon. New York Times (Bugmenot to avoid registration)

If indigenous resistance to genetic research were based solely on questions of ownership, promises to not patent the data and to store only the small segments of the genome useful in tracing ancestry would probably work. That The Genographic Project has been so much more successful thus far than Cavalli-Sforza's HGDP shows this much. It is much more ethically sound.

The real issue is of course, as the article shows, the conflict between data (indigenous Americans share a close common ancestry with Siberians, other Asians, and the rest of us) and beliefs (indigenous Americans / one specific people / humanity in general formed in America). At first glance this is "science vs. faith" and the position against genetic research seems untenable. If it were solely a matter of "traditional belief" vs. "impartial science" I would support the science completely. The existence of belief systems which actually do wish to undermine Indians' indigineity and which cheer on this science complicates the matter considerably. The initial excitement of racists about the supposedly European features (since debunked) of Kennewick Man and the more moderate, but still questionable extension of "we are all immigrants" sentiments to indigenous peoples show that there is some substance to these concerns that goes beyond attachment to mythology. In order for sequencing to become politically non-controversial, the following needs to be clearly understood:

The fact that their ancient ancestors migrated from Asia in no way undermines Amerinidian peoples' status as indigenous or their historical experience of marginalization vis-à-vis post-Columbian immigrant peoples and European-derived polities and land tenure. At the time of the settlement of the Americas Scandinavia, Ireland, and most of Britain were covered by ice. Should we declare Swedes, Finns and Scots to be 'mere' immigrants? Recent research by Stephen Oppenheimer points to stone age Spain as the source of the majority of even England's genetic legacy. Similarly, recent roots, the visible past of colonialism and the slave trade, and current international political structures make today's Africans more African than those of us whose ancestors left, including the Native Americans'.

That current conditions and recent history should be important should be a no brainer, but recent history has shown that people on a whole are very influenced by science's results regarding the anthropology and history of whole continents of peoples. The science should go on, but scientists and science journalists need to be careful about prejudice influencing data and the simplification of results that comes from popularization. Just as an obsession with classification combined with the inequalities of the global economy to create race and racism, an overemphasis on the macro structure of the human family tree (branching out from Africa into separate populations) ignores a number of equally important (and equally scientific) narratives. These include continued genetic transfer and cultural diffusion between "branches" (New York Times science writer Nicholas Wade, among others, annoyingly ignore this important aspect of human prehistory), our extremely recent common ancestry, and the much more present narratives of modern history and cultural tradition.

All of these narratives overlap, of course, but this in itself is not inherently problematic. It is when people overinterpret the data (both scientists and their critics frequently do so) without reference to its explanatory limits that political problems arise. Y chromosome and mtDNA results record only two of countless human family trees, genetic relatedness is not the only definition of identity (whether family, tribal, or national), and creation myths do not have to be understood literally to be important cultural truths. Though the Havasupai's ancestors may not have emerged fully formed, literally, from the Grand Canyon, they are a part of that place, and the origin of that people, as they have come to understand themselves is in that land. If someday we can all feel the same way, as a people, about our common origin in Africa's Great Rift Valley, we will have made a very important step toward solving our problems.

Thank You, Your Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty!

Whoever said the Imperial and Royal Army of Austria-Hungary never did anything for them in 1910 never had a chance to use their 3rd Military Mapping Survey on the Internet a century later.

This 1:200,000 topographic map covers all of Central Europe from Cologne to Istanbul, from Nice to Kiev, and from Szczecin to Rome. The scale of Venice and Istanbul below (reduced 50% here) should give you an idea of how detailed this map is. If you are interested in doing detailed historical and/or genealogical research on the Balkans, Central Europe, southern Germany, or northern Italy. It's also useful for planning a revolution, if you can manage to travel back in time first.





A Monarchia III. katonai felmérése: Közép-Európa általános földrajzi térképének (1:200 000) szelvénybeosztása (index map has names of cities in Hungarian, 267 individual maps in German, Polish, Italian, etc.)

Mater of fact, pater of opinion

We're all familiar with patrilineal descents. The genealogies of biblical patriarchs, tribe and clan names from Scotland to Maharashtra to Somalia to China, rabbinic dynasties, royal families, and modern surnames illustrate the extent to which kinship, identity, and inheritance have been based on the relationship between father and child, particularly among the agricultural and pastoral peoples of Eurasia and Africa. Those tracing their family genealogy also tend to concentrate on surname lines (if not their own, their children's, their mother's, or their grandmothers') for two related reasons. First, their own surname and those of their close kin are more psychologically meaningful to people than names they have never heard, so these lines are an obvious place to focus research. Second, since people in previous generations thought the same way, male lines are easier to trace.

Genetic genealogy has added another advantage to the male line. The Y chromosome of two men with the same surname (men, because women don't have a Y chromosome) who don't know if they have a common male ancestor can be tested to find out the probability that they do. The Y chromosome is copied pretty much faithfully from father to son, but mutations that occur from time to time at a regular rate make it possible to tell approximately when the man who carried a version ancestral to both lived. Because people tend to reproduce with people who live near them, it is also possible to tell approximately where he lived (though there will be much caution as to the limits of this in this blog).

There is a problem though. As Mark Twain should have said, "Maternity is a matter of fact; paternity is a matter of opinion." Where p is the number of conceptions that had to occur for a common ancestor to produce two descendants and c is the rate of non-paternity (where the purported biological father is not the actual biological father), the likelihood that the two descendants will share a genetic patrilineal descent is (1-c)^p. Even if c is very small, and the lowest estimate I've ever seen for non-paternity among men who have high paternity confidence is 1.9%, the likelihood drops below 50% for a common ancestor who lived 500 years ago, and the highest the non-paternity rate can be in order for two genealogically-related men with a common ancestor who lived 200 years ago to have a >50% probability of sharing the same Y chromosome is 4.83%. This is low enough to be very useful, and, indeed, common patrilineal ancestors of people with the same surname or clan identity have been found in the very distant past, but a warning is necessary. Supposedly, the common ancestor of men who carry the Cohen modal haplotype lived something like 3500 years ago, and about 50% of Kohanim carry it, necessitating a non-paternity rate of only 0.54% per generation. Whether this says more about the effectiveness of Jewish sexual law or the errors in Skorecki, et al.'s mutation rate calculation is open to question.

I find matrilineal descent more interesting. Everyone has mitochondria, and mitchondria are passed only from mother to child (well, usually). Mitochondrial DNA makes it possible to trace uterine, or matrilineal descent, which was much more commonly used as an identity structure in the past, but which is currently limited to clan groups among peoples who had been until recently relatively isolated from the Eastern Hemipshere global economy and in traces in the rituals and religious laws of many groups which are in most others ways patrilineal, such as in Judaism and in South India.

Matrilineal descents are particularly fun within a large genealogical database. The largest that exist are primarily data on the royal and noble families of Europe, and looking at them is instructive both for studies of kinship and of European history. Patrilineally, European dynasties, just like those in the rest of the world, tended to be drawn from the lineage of the more powerful military leaders during a key period of historical development. For the European dynasties that were in charge of states from the early medieval to the modern period, this was in the three or four centuries following the fall of the Western Roman Empire in the 5th century, and then even more rapidly with the expansion of feudal structures from the Carolingian Empire in the 8th through 10th centuries. Oldenburg, Capets/Bourbon/Aviz, Habsburg, Wittelsbach, Piast, all date to this time. What's interesting is that royal matrilineal descents also tend to trace to only a few 10th century women, perhaps even fewer than the male lines. After all, it's more difficult to get an unbroken line of daughters than an unbroken line of sons (men have more children). Also, because of the genetic tests used to identify the bodies of Nicholas and Alexandra in their grave in Yekaterinburg, we know what mitochondrial haplogroups they and their matrilineal relatives belonged to:

It's now been questioned whether or not the researchers actually did find Nicholas and Alexandra (the Russian government doesn't want to hear it though), but the known identity relatives they tested as a control make it still possible to trace those mitchondrial lineages. Prince Philip and Alix, both Haplogroup H, are descended through the female line from Queen Victoria, and through her to a 13th century Spanish noblewoman nicknamed La Palomilla. The rest of the current British Royal Family are not in this line, since the Queen, the Prince of Wales, and all the rest are descended in the female line from English gentry and commoners, not from royal families, but other descendants of La Palomilla include Marie de' Medici, Charles II, James II, and William III of England, Louis XIV of France, and Felipe III, Carlos II, and Felipe V of Spain. Marie Antoinette was also tested as Haplogroup H, but her earliest known matrilineal ancestor (and that of Pedro II of Brazil, Stanisław August Poniatowski, and many others) was a 12th century German noblewoman named Bertha von Putelendorf. Through the Tsar and his brother, Haplogroup T has another royal lineage that includes the Electress Sophia, Charles I of England, George V of Great Britain, and Charles X of Sweden.

The one I find most interesting though is not descended from a Western European source, but instead from Euphrosyne Dukaina Kamatera, the wife of Roman Emperor Alexios III and great-grandmother of Michael VIII, the Emperor who took Constantinople back from the Crusaders. One of her great-granddaughters married the Saljuq Sultan of Rum at Konya, one of her granddaughters, Maria Laskarina, married Béla IV of Hungary. The latter is a matrilineal ancestor of George IV and William IV of Great Britan, Emperor Maxmilian of Mexico, Kazimierz the Great of Poland, Alexander III of Russia, and Wenceslas II of Bohemia.

And now for the question that genealogists so rarely ask (sorry!): what's the point? That Charles I's head bled Haplogroup T blood all over his platform at Whitehall tells us nothing about the English Civil War. What matters is that royal genealogy databases are our biggest, and analyzing them in detail (even though highly mobile nobles were an exceptional group) tells us about how rapidly descent can diffuse geographically. Europeans who are Haplogroup O (most common in China) or European Americans who are descended from Genghis Khan show up all the time. They are not the norm, but neither are they so rare as many would like to think. It is even easier for descent to pass through all lines than just through males and females, and there are enough of documented entrance points of Arab, African, and Central Asian lines into royal databases to be worthy of looking at to provide real world examples that back up the mathematics that show our species' most recent common ancestors to be very recent indeed.

For a later post:

• When did our most recent common ancestors live?
  
• If it was as recent as mathematicians Chang and Rohde calculate (3rd to 1st millennium BC), why does it matter even though none of us likely carry a single gene from those ancestors? (short hint: kinship and identity do not correlate to genetics)
  

Links: Ysearch, Misattributed paternity rates and non-paternity rates, Roglo database, Famous DNA,
Reading recommendations: Sarah Franklin and Susan McKinnon, eds.. Relative values: reconfiguring kinship studies. Durham, NC: Duke University press, 2001; Patricia Buckley Ebrey and James L. Watson, eds. Kinship organization in late imperial China: 1000-1940. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986.